



Natural Gas Europe Outlook: Managing without Russian gas.

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
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Price & Volatility




Gas Year 2021: What a year it has been. A price rally dominated by Russian supply concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.




Volatility causing lower liquidity

Lower liquidity as a result of higher prices and rising margin costs. Extreme price swings and higher prices has seen liquidity fall and volatility increase.




	Average	High	Low
SUM 22 TTF DA €/MWh	151	330	77
SUM 21 TTF DA €/MWh	37	93	19

Volatility & Volume




Gas Year 2021: What a year it has been. A price rally dominated by Russian supply concerns and geopolitical uncertainty.




	Average	High	Low
SUM 22 NBP DA	217p/th	570p/th	12p/Th
SUM 21 NBP DA	93p/Th	203p/Th	50p/Th

UK Exports expected to remain high driven by the untypical spread between NBP & TTF.



Same story on the NBP V TTF FM spread







Looking at the fundamentals

In war all means are good: Russian gas weapon

Russian export to NWE




Russian total exports to NWE year on year



Record high earnings for Gazprom



In Gas Year 2021 Russian exports to Europe halved while sales return tripled. Calculated returns is calculated as total volumes multiplied by TTF FM index.

Calculated Return from Russian exports
(TurkStream2, Yamal Europe, Ukraine route and NS1)



Entering the winter at a healthy storage level. But is it enough?

As per 1 October European inventories are filled at 88%, well above the 80% target for 1 November.




88.4% of EU gas storage is filled.


Additional LNG and demand disruption helped this year.

Without Russian gas supply Europe needs more of the same “medicine” .


Baseload supply to NWE&UK



Baseload demand NWE&UK



Supply Outlook Base Case: NWE unlikely to be able to substitute all Russian supply.






LNG Winter Outlook: Sailing into the unknown

Northwest Europe – a premium market for uncommitted cargoes

DES Northwest Europe and Asian spot – dictates the arbitrage for uncommitted Atlantic cargoes




Source: Reuters News, ICE, Waterborne

Northwest Europe – unprecedented surge in cargo arrivals!

Jan-Sept: NW Europe imports up by 91% yoy or ~30 bcm – total Europe by 66% yoy or 52 bcm


Bcm/month



Source: Refinitiv, TSO

Chinese LNG imports - steep drop - led by a confluence of factors


Jan-Aug: LNG imports down 22% or 15.8 bcm



Source: Chinese Customs

Demand destruction among several South Asian LNG importers


Jan-Sept: LNG imports to India, Pakistan & Bangladesh combined - down 15.7% yoy or 6 bcm



Source: PPACell, Refinitiv flows data


Cargo arrivals to NW Europe*: forecast for winter 2022-23

Base scenario – could see an increase of 18 bcm



Source: Refinitiv, TSO
* UK, Nld, Bel, Fra, Ger


Winter supply outlook – expected growth of 15 bcm or 5.5% YoY



Source: Refinitiv

Winter demand outlook


Ex Northwest Europe - expect to see a decline of 3 bcm or -1% yoy



Source: Refinitiv

China – holds the key for European winter LNG


Oct - Mar: variation between low- and high scenario of almost 10bcm



Source: Refinitiv, Chinese Customs

Cargo arrivals to NW Europe: forecast for winter 2022-23

Base scenario – could see an increase of 18bcm



Uncertain if the high inflow scenario could be fully accommodated - depends on when new import capacity will be operational

Source: Refinitiv, TSO

And – beyond this winter: summer 23 & winter 2023-24?

Do not expect any material change in supply availability to NW Europe

- SUPPLY: growth to slow down from 5.5% growth to 3.2%
The U.S. and Africa the main contributors
- DEMAND:
 - China: LNG imports to grow moderately
 - Japan & South Korea: declining imports as new nuclear reactors are coming online
 - Other Asia: some modest recovery in LNG demand
 - Europe ex Northwest: robust demand growth




Norway

Norway is squeezing as much as possible. Hard to get more


WIN22: maturation of core fields continues, Dvalin (9mcm) can partly offset if starts as scheduled in Dec-22, but needs to ramp up first. SUM23: heavy maintenance schedule; For both GY22 and GY23, we assume flexible Troll and Oseberg maximising production.

Norwegian pipeline exports




Heavy maintenance schedule for SUMMER 2023 in Norway

NCS maintenance total summer impact on fields and processing plants



Baltic Pipe: redirecting Norwegian gas from the Continent






Dutch Production

Dutch production continues to decline

Groningen quota for GY22 is 2.9bcm vs 4.5 bcm, other fields maturation continues. Delay in Zuidbroek would support majority of GY22 quota to produce in WIN22. No Groningen gas is expected in GY23










Demand: LDZ

LDZ consumption in GY21 is the lowest over the last five years.

WIN21 was slightly warmer than WIN20. Total LDZ consumption in NWE is 5% down WIN21 on WIN20 and 3% down to average of last 5 years.




Weather is a core uncertainty and driver for Residential (LDZ) consumption



Heating (LDZ) consumption: weather is the core


We utilize 20 weather scenarios of actual weather 2001-2020.



Focusing on three weather scenarios

Central: average of last 20 years synthetic consumption; **Cold** weather as of GY2010; **Mild** weather as of GY2018.

WIN22 F to WIN21: Central 2% down; Cold 5% up; Mild 7% down






Demand :
Gas for power and
Industry


Forecast for strong increase in gas for power demand

Central forecast indicates a 30% increase in GY22 from GY21. Main reasons: Intermittent nuclear availability and low hydro inflow in France; Nuclear phaseouts in Germany (-4GW) and Belgium (-1GW). Our central forecast is based on 30 years average weather, the last two winters had healthy wind and no prolonged cold episodes.

Gas for power (NWE&UK)








Gas for power by country




Gas for power forecast by country

Belgium strong due to lower nuclear output falling, thereafter with increased renewable capacity and net power imports
France nuclear intermittency a big uncertainty, down 10GW to 33GW this year, production forecast higher in 2023. UK forecast to be a net power exporter until June 23. German nuclear and coal exits provide short term upside, renewable capacity increases lowers future gas burn. Netherlands falling coal capacity and stronger power exports increase gas burn.




Emergency Intervention Scenario: Cutting power demand by 5% during 10% of selected peak price hours.

Low impact on gas for power demand.







Main demand disruption is visible in industry, particularly the last few months of this summer.

SUM22 on SUM21 drop in total industrial demand across NWE is 17%. Steel, chemicals, paper and ceramic industries hardest hit. Mittal shuttered 3 plants in Germany one in France. Ammonia production also impacted over 5 facilities inc Yara sites in France and the Netherlands. High prices, falling Global GDP output & inflationary pressures continue to impact production.







Industrial gas demand by country

The strongest industrial demand disruption summer on summer is the Netherlands (22%); Germany (17%), Belgium 14% France (11%).



Normally stable Industrial consumption is in uncertain territory


Uncertainty is large, there is a potential for more disruption, but we apply the observed reduction. Base case: deducts from average of GY19 and GY20 250GWh/d for Germany; 100GWh/d for Netherlands; 35GWh/d for Belgium; 40GWh/d for France





**Storage is a key
barometer**

Central scenario: Close to record storage levels by the end of the season.




Source: Reuters News, ICE

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
Pray for a mild winter or more demand disruption

Unless winter is mild. Even if we manage through this winter, we need to manage through the summer and a winter again....This should keep prices elevated.




Sensitivity: How much demand disruption do we need?

In our balance 6% of additional demand reduction across GY22 in Central scenario would bring storages to the comfortable level. For Cold scenario this requires 13% of demand disruption.



Sensitivity: If Russian supply continues via Velke Kapusany at current 395GWh/d (undisrupted to Italy)

Better for the Central scenario, but does not help if the winter is cold.



Source: Reuters News, ICE

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Conclusion

- Without Russian gas European market will remain extremely tight for at least next two years.
- LNG is largely the main source of additional supply to offset Russian volumes.
- Strong increase in regasification capacity in NWE should help bringing more LNG to the region, but will not be able to offset Russian supply fully
- Unless winter is mild, there is a need for demand disruption to balance European market during GY22.
- In the outcome of the cold winter there is a risk for a gas shortage.

Risks

- Return of China to the LNG spot market.
- French nuclear concerns, lower renewable generation.
- A beast from the east scenario.
- Extended production outages (infrastructure damage) in Europe and any disruption to US LNG exports

Source: Reuters News, ICE

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